proclaimed authority as commander in chief, was often able to take foreign policy steps that created a fait accompli and made the exercise of that will even harder. As long as a condition of permanent cold-war crisis prevailed, it would be difficult to defend the authority of Congress against usurpation by the president and the national security bureaucracy he managed.
The Reagan administration's conduct of Central American policy provided the first sustained test of the post-Vietnam-Watergate formula. It demonstrated the continued willingness of the executive branch to abuse its authority in foreign policy and suggested the limits of legislative reform when not backed by a strong congressional will.
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE POST-VIETNAM-WATERGATE FORMULA
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department.... [T]he trust and the temptation would be too great for any one man.... War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war, a physical force is to be created; and it is the executive will, which is to direct it. In war, the public treasures are to be unlocked; and it is the executive hand which is to dispense them. In war, the honours and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage By corrupting presidential elections through the solicitation of illegal contributions, by a systematic campaign of mendacity, trickery and character assassination against opponents . . . Mr. Nixon gravely endangered the integrity of our republican system of government.3
The reaction was growing support for impeachment and an attempt to strengthen constitutional democracy. A set of three related commitments -a post-Vietnam formula -were embodied in new laws, procedures, and institutional arrangements. One commitment was to get access to information about executive activities, a necessary condition for checks and balances to work. A second was to restore congressional legislative authority in foreign policy and strengthen congressional checks on potential abuses of authority at home and abroad. A third commitment was to limit the possibilities for political repression and violations of civil liberties and civil rights, about which I have written elsewhere.4 This article will focus on the first two commitments.
Access to information. The conflict between secrecy and disclosure has had a long history. The recurrent pattern was demonstrated in 1798 when Benjamin Franklin Bache of the Philadelphia Aurora published a secret dispatch from the French to the secretary of state in order to show that the French wanted peace and the John Adams administration wanted war. He was arrested for seditious libel, and Congress was spurred to pass the Sedition Act. The issue then and for later generations was not the government's right to secrecy; The Federalist No. 64 argued that executive secrecy was vital in diplomatic negotiation and in "the business of intelligence." Rather it was whether or not the suppressed information was really vital or was suppressed in order to prevent an informed citizenry from making its own decisions and to protect the government from public opposition. When Congress passed the Espionage Act in 1917, it sought to prevent its misuse by overzealous presidents when it rejected a provision that would have made it a crime to publish information that "might" be used by the enemy. Instead it demanded proof that the person disclosing information had "reason to believe" it could be used "to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation."5 Congress's power to gain access to information through investigation was strengthened by a 1927 Supreme Court decision stating that a legislative body "cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislative is intended to affect or change...."6 But the problem of the balance between secrecy and disclosure deepened during and after World War II with the development and expansion of a classification system for information, a specialized national security bureaucracy with a vested interest in secrecy, and the widespread fear of Communist agents and subversion. One legislative response was to require certain critical information. The 1973 War Powers Resolution demanded that the president inform Congress in writing within forty-eight hours of introducing troops (in the absence of a declaration of war) into areas of hostilities or where imminent involvement in hostilities was likely. The reasons for introducing the troops, the legal authority justifying the introduction, and the scope and duration of the commitment had to be specified.
The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment (amended again in 1980) required that the president report in "a timely fashion" all CIA covert operations other than intelligence gathering to appropriate committees. And legislation in 1976 and 1977 created Select Intelligence Committees in the Senate and House respectively. This allowed some oversight and control by the Congress, and there were mechanisms under certain circumstances for public disclosure of the classified information given to the committees.
The ability of the president to make secret executive agreements was limited by the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, which required all executive agreements to be reported to Congress. In 1974 Congress also required that arms sales be so reported. If the president declared a national emergency, Congress required him to inform it of the specific laws under which he proposed to act, to file with Congress all executive agency rules and regulations, and to account for expenditures. Congress also strengthened the Freedom of Information Act in 1974 to provide for judicial review of decisions by executive agencies to keep all parts of a document classified.
Perhaps more important than the specific statutes was the general commitment Congress made to watch presidential actions more carefully and to use its existing powers as leverage to demand that foreign policy decisions be shared. The greater size and foreign policy expertise of staff members were also important. Such staff provided independent sources of information and allowed concerned members of Congress to use existing mechanisms better to provide oversight of foreign policy.
Restoring Shared Control. The new commitment to get access to information was aimed at allowing Congress increased participation in the making of foreign policy and a greater ability to check executive excesses. Constitutionally, much of the necessary power was already in the hands of Congress: the authority to declare war, to advise and consent on treaties and appointments, and the ultimate "check" through its power of the purse. But Congress was concerned about the various mechanisms or precedents that had developed to allow the president to circumvent congressional control. Of particular concern was an old problem in the struggle over foreign policy -the ability of the president to create situations that forced congressional acquiescence and created an antecedent, afait accompli, which limited Congress's will and ability to use its existing powers. Alexander Hamilton had recognized that "the executive in the exercise of its constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things, which ought to weigh in the legislative decision," a situation which Madison feared could create a dangerous shift in the congressional balance.7
In 1846 President James Polk sent U.S. troops into an area contested by Mexico and Texas. When they were predictably attacked by Mexican soldiers, he forced Congress's hand. In 1907 Theodore Roosevelt sent the fleet around the world in the face of strong congressional opposition, but Congress had to give the funds for fuel and supplies to bring it back. During and after World War II, congressional acquiescence allowed a dangerous growth of the president's prerogative as commander in chief. Corwin wrote after the war: there is Presidential initiative and Presidential initiative -that type which, recognizing that Congress has powers -great powers -in the premises, seeks to win its collaboration; and that type which, invoking the "Commander-in-Chief' clause proceeds to stake out Congress's course by a series of faits accomplis.8
In the cold-war years this kind of initiative, in which the president presented Congress with afait accompli, grew more and more common. Presidents involved the United States in full-scale war by first committing troops to foreign lands (Truman in Korea, Kennedy and Johnson in Vietnam) and then arguing that the troops could not be abandoned or that commitments made had to be honored to protect American credibility. Presidents increasingly made secret executive agreements that bound the United States to certain foreign policies without congressional debate and authorization. Presidents ordered covert operations that involved the United States in policies that Congress could disown only at the risk of seeming to undermine national security. By the late 1960s the president had an unprecedented ability to create an antecedent state of things; and the argument that Congress had to stand by presidential commitments had a much more important place in U.S. foreign policy than in the past.
Congress attempted to hold the president accountable by insisting on full consultation and shared decision making before the policy die was cast. Some of this was handled legislatively. For example the War Powers Act aimed to "insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply" to the decision to send U.S. troops into hostilities by insisting that the president consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before the troops are introduced.9 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee described the resolution as "an invitation to the executive to reconsider its excesses, and to the legislature to reconsider its omissions, in the making of foreign policy."10 Congress also established procedures by which the new access to information The new formula that emerged after Vietnam and Watergate represented concern both about the process of foreign-policy decision making and about the content of foreign policy. There was an awareness in Congress, and later in the Carter administration, that Third World turmoil was often caused by local conditions of poverty and repression, and that a "North-South" perspective was more realistic than an "East-West" perspective. Critics of the Vietnam policy were wary of sending U.S. troops to fight in Third World countries where the goals were not clearly defined and the conflict was unpopular at home. Many were opposed to supporting corrupt, repressive regimes and sought instead to condition foreign military and economic aid on a regime's human rights performance.
These new commitments to both process and content allowed Congress to take a more aggressive role in shaping Central American policy than it had in shaping early Vietnam policy. In the Carter administration this was most visible in the compromises and policy changes the administration was forced to accept in order to get congressional approval of the Panama Canal treaties and of economic assistance to the new Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. But a much more serious and sustained test came when the Reagan administration took office. Its willingness to aid repressive regimes facing domestic turmoil troubled many in Congress, and its emphasis on a military strategy in Central America raised the spectre of the involvement of U.S. troops in "another Vietnam." Moderates in Congress were particularly worried that the commitments being made to El Salvador (and later to Honduras and to the Nicaraguan exile army) would eventually draw in U.S. troops. They did not count on the War Powers Resolution alone; they understood that presidential initiatives could make it difficult to oppose the President if he sent troops. They wanted to participate from the very beginning in shaping policy. The president had to certify that the Salvadoran government was "making a concerted ... effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights," was "achieving substantial control over all elements of its armed forces, so as to bring an end . . . to indiscriminate torture and murder," was "making continued progress in . . . land reform," and was "committed to the holding of free elections.""2
The conditionality requirement was weak: once the president certified, aid was automatically released. But the requirement made clear the broad opposition in Congress to aid for a repressive, reactionary regime; and it underlined the widespread belief that real reform was the only way to stop revolution. Presidential certification every six months also forced a certain public accountability, and the congressional hearings around each certification provided for careful scrutiny of administration facts and stimulated through media coverage public debate and education.
The administration, however, provided false and misleading information in order to certify that the conditions required for aid existed, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Further, it refused to put serious pressure on the Salvadoran military to end its human rights abuses. To pick but one example, it repeatedly denied the well substantiated charges (confirmed by its own internal documents) that thousands of civilian noncombatants were being killed by government forces and "death squads" organized or aided by top military officials. 13 In each case the President was obeying the letter but not the spirit of the law. The special funds he drew on for military aid were put aside by Congress for use in emergency situations at presidential discretion. Although there was no emer-gency in these cases, the President defined them as such in order to circumvent a congressional debate on supplemental appropriations that he was likely to lose. Similarly, reprogramming -which requires only that the appropriations committees be informed of executive budget reallocations and not object within fifteen dayswas designed to give the bureaucracy flexibility in reallocating funds among budget categories, not to provide a way to circumvent congressional debate on controversial aid authorizations. Yet the large volume of often legitimate reprogram requests makes it nearly impossible for the committees to quickly evaluate how funds are being allocated.16 House leaders eventually grew critical of such circumventions. In 1983, the Appropriations Committee cut the reprogramming request for $60 million down to $30 million. House leaders warned the President not to continue to use his special drawdown authority to fund unauthorized military aid to El Salvador.
The administration tried another tack. In early 1984 it came to Congress with a request for an emergency supplemental appropriation for $93 million; Congress approved $61.75. Secretary of State George Shultz claimed that the Salvadorans were "running out of supplies right now" and other officials stated that "without these funds, the El Salvadoran Armed Forces will either go back to the barracks or collapse."'17 It turned out there was no emergency; $32 million of military aid already in the pipeline could have been diverted if necessary, and much of the emergency supplemental aid was used to expand the army by building new units. 18 The 1984 and 1985 elections in El Salvador radically changed the character of congressional-executive relations. The election of Jose Napoleon Duarte, a recognized reformer, reinforced the administration's definition of the government as centrist and reformist. Many moderates grew reluctant to oppose aid, despite evidence that the military, not Duarte, was still the real power in El Salvador and that military corruption and repression were continuing. Congress approved the administration's aid requests. This aid, and particularly the aggressive air mobile tactics it provided, enabled the Salvadoran military severely to limit the guerrillas' offensive capabilities. This, in turn, reassured Congress that the aid was not making U.S. military intervention more likely. The admistration continued to provide misleading and false information about the economic and political situation in El Salvador, the growing isolation of Duarte from his own supporters, and above all the repression by the military. There was some decline in politically-targeted death squad killings, but the White House denied the documented killing and forced 16 Initially the committees treated all such requests as routine and trusted the executive to use this budgetary discretion reasonably. the Comptroller General found that funds appropriated for operation and maintenance of our armed forces were used for military construction projects, security assistance activities, and civic action and humanitarian assistance. The Committee believes such diversion of funding from properly appropriated purposes is unwarranted and directs that the Department of Defense take such steps as necessary to prevent recurrence of such improprieties in the future.20 On 23 November 1981 President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 17 and a secret finding that was submitted to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees informing them that $19.95 million in CIA funds would be used to support 500 contras who would infiltrate Nicaragua to interdict purported arms flows to Salvadoran rebels. By so informing these congressional committees, the administration was carefully responding to the letter of the law. These committees did not protest, because the interdiction rationale made sense to members concerned to contain a leftist revolution supported by the Nicaraguans.
While some in the administration may have initially supported the program simply to interdict arms, major actors such as the exiles the CIA was funding, CIA operatives in the field, and hardliners in the administration had a very different purpose -to overthrow the Sandinista regime. This view became even more prevalent as the operation grew in 1982 and 1983. The so-called hard and soft liners, mostly in the State Department, did not approve of attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, but saw building up the contras as a way of creating a credible threat with which to pressure the Sandinistas to bargain over security issues and ultimately over the internal character of their regime. But the broad purposes of Nicaragua policy were not presented to the congressional committees for scrutiny and debate. It was only in the following years, as congressional opposition built, that the administration quietly introduced the pressure logic. The President's public position until the 1985 congressional debates was that "we are not doing anything to overthrow the government of Nicaragua."24 An effort to misinform or deceive Congress was always an important element of administration policy. But secret wars are never secret from the people being warred on and are not long secret from Congress and the American public. As early as 4 December 1981, articles began to appear in the American press about the covert U.S. action. They were soon followed by information from Florida about training camps for the contras and then by reports from the field about contra activities. As the press revealed the scope and character of contra activities, the House Intelligence Committee sought to limit American aid to its original purpose. In December 1982, Representative Edward Boland (D. Mass.), chairman of the committee, introduced language (the Boland Amendment) into the Continuing Resolution for fiscal year 1983 prohibiting the use of funds "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua."25 The administration's response was to expand contra operations to include sabotage raids on such targets as oil supplies and port facilities. While acknowledging that the aim of the contras might be to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, the administration insisted that it was within the law because its purpose in giving the aid was arms interdiction, not overthrow.26 The Democratic leadership in the House grew angry, and in 1983 the House Intelligence Committee voted to cut off all funds.
The Republican-controlled Senate Intelligence Committee refused to go along with a total cutoff, and a cap of $24 million was put on contra aid for fiscal year 1984. But the administration circumvented congressional spending limits: certain expenses like the mining of Nicaragua's harbors were charged to other accounts; an airfield for the contras was built in Aguacate, Honduras, as a part of a Defense Department exercise and then made available to the contras as a logistics and transportation center; and the Defense Department donated aircraft to transport sup- Again the administration circumvented the law. The National Security Council helped organize and advise a private aid network to fund the contras. According to some administration officials, the plan was approved both by National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane and the President. Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, a member of the National Security Council staff, was put in charge. North helped reorganize and coordinate operations of the two main rebel groups, gave tactical advice, helped the contras raise millions in private and secret public funds, and arranged for supplies and contributions to reach the contras.
While there was consternation among contra aid critics and Congress threatened to hold hearings, nothing was done to sanction North and little could be done to undo his work. The White House, in the words of Representative Michael Barnes (D. Md.), stonewalled, refusing, for example, to release requested documents on its management of the private network and circumvention of the Boland Amendment. It was not until the Iran-contra affair broke in late 1986 that Congress and the press began to uncover the full details of the National Security 27 See, for example, ibid., 5-6. In September 1984, for example, the Defense Department was discovered transferring three Cessna OA2 noncombat aircraft to a top secret Joint Chiefs of Staff operation code named "Elephant Herd." The planes were officially declared "excess" and dropped from the air force's inventory roster. Having officially disappeared, they were then flown to the New York State National Guard, and next to a CIA contractor who fitted the aircraft with rocket pods for combat. They were then delivered, via intermediaries, to the contras. Blaine Harden and Joe Pichirallo, "CIA Said to Supply Planes to Nicaraguan Rebels," Washington Post, 15 September 1984.
Council's involvement in circumventing Congress. It became clear that millions of dollars in profits made on secret arms sales to Iran were diverted to supply the contras; that the NSC had been involved in secretly raising millions for the contras from foreign governments (Saudi Arabia, Brunei); and that National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter and a top official at the State Department (Elliot Abrams, assistant secretary of state for Latin America) and the CIA (including Director William Casey) were also involved. It was further revealed that the contra operation was the centerpiece of an even larger covert effort labelled "Project Democracy" authorized by President Reagan in the January 1983 National Security Decision Directive No.77; and that North and private individuals had set up "the enterprise," an extra-government agency (described by North as an "off-the-shelf, self-sustaining, stand-alone entity") to finance and carry out intelligence operations all over the world outside normal government control.29
Between 1984 and 1986, as the NSC was circumventing the congressional ban, the CIA was also secretly giving the Nicaraguan rebels aid. More than $1.5 million went for "political" operations to finance "security," a radio station, and to seek political and financial support in Europe and Venezuela. The CIA also helped carry out the elaborate contra supply operation run by the NSC (dramatically revealed after a plane was shot down in October 1986 and American mercenary Eugene Hasenfus was captured by the Nicaraguans and put on trial) and actively tried to reorganize and strengthen contra activities in Costa Rica.
Although full details did not emerge until late 1986 and early 1987, by early 1985 there was enough information for Congress to demand that future funding of the "covert" war be openly debated and legislated through normal channels. This debate was different from the one on El Salvador, because Congress viewed rollback much more critically than containment. U.S. involvement in overthrowing a foreign government raised both moral issues and fears of dragging U.S. troops into a quagmire.
When forced to fight openly for aid, the administration's strategy was to insist that there was no alternative to the contras -and that even the negotiations insisted upon by moderates needed the force of the contras to back them up. There were two elements to this strategy. One was a somewhat successful administration effort to impose its definition of reality on the situation. The internal character of the regime in Nicaragua was presented as so abhorrent and the security threat as so great that any opponent of Reagan administration efforts could be delegitimized as soft on both security and communism. The administration did not hesitate to lie and distort reality in order to create the image it wanted.30 As ideology and distorted information replaced fact, rational debate about the means and ends of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua became increasingly difficult. The more the Democrats accepted the purpose of policy as getting the Sandinista regime out of power (as opposed to negotiating security issues, for example), the more difficult it became to offer an alternative other than the contras.
The second element of administration strategy was systematically to scuttle all efforts at negotiated settlements -the efforts of the Contadora countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama) for example -that recognized the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan government.3' By destroying all other alternatives, the contras were made to seem the only alternative.
Important to both elements of this whole strategy, however, was the fact that the contras already existed: this fait accompli, brought about covertly, was what gave the administration its leverage in the important votes in 1985 and 1986.
When contra aid came before Congress in April 1985, the House narrowly defeated the administration request. But on 12 June, seventy-three Democrats abandoned the House leadership and joined 175 Republicans in supporting a compromise package that banned lethal military aid and restricted CIA involvement in disbursing the aid. A number of the Democrats were conservative southerners who felt that voting against the aid would make them vulnerable to charges that they were "soft on communism." Alluding to this issue, majority leader Jim Wright (D. Tex.), who himself opposed the aid, said that "to some degree" the country was going through an era reminiscent of McCarthyism. "Nobody wants to be portrayed as friendly toward Communism."32 Many moderate Democrats and Republicans reversed their votes because they felt ill at ease at turning down the President's request in April without providing an alternative. "A good many of our guys," said Wright "don't believe in waging war to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, but they feel some responsibility to those doing the fighting."33 This was how the administration had defined the issue, and it was reinforced shortly after the April vote when Nicaraguan President who switched his vote, said, "I think the President of the United States for the first time is saying that he is for negotiations and meaning it."35 By the time the crucial vote for $100 million in contra aid came up in the House in March 1986 (it was defeated 222-210) and in June (it passed 221-209) the hook of commitment had already been sunk. While the majority of Democrats (about 183) opposed any aid, the thirty or so crucial swing votes accepted administration arguments that the contras could not be abandoned and that they were a useful tool for pressing negotiations.
In both June 1985 and June 1986, the arguments that swayed middle-of-theroaders would not have made sense if a huge contra army had not already been created and if other alternatives had not been undermined or defined out of existence. Administration policies had created the very "antecedent state of things" that the post-Vietnam formula had sought to avoid by insisting that important foreign policy decisions be shared from the beginning by Congress and the president. This situation had been created by the kind of circumvention, secrecy, and deception the post-Vietnam formula had sought to check.
The efforts to win continued funding in late 1987 were still undecided as this article goes to press. The Iran-contra scandal seriously weakened the administration's credibility and angered Congress at the way in which lying, distortion and law breaking had been used to circumvent congressional authority. This conclusion is apt today. When Congress, the press, and the public were willing to exercise political power, the post-Vietnam formula often worked. It helped Congress get access to information needed to participate in the making of foreign policy, and it ultimately helped cut off the private funding network in the aftermath of the Iran-contra revelations. But more often than not, Congress was unwilling to exercise its potential power. It did not demand to participate in ways that would have limited the president's ability to create an antecedent state of things or to break and circumvent the law.
Mistrust of executive information led members of Congress to use existing institutional mechanisms of oversight (requests for GAO reports on contra corruption, committee hearings on misuses of military maneuver and construction funds, etc.) and to create new mechanisms to generate and crosscheck information (the certification procedures on El Salvador). A number of reporters did investigative reports that in turn were used by members of Congress. Further, the requirement that the intelligence committees be informed of covert operations proved very important. Although information on the covert war was publicly available through the press almost immediately after it began, these committees provided an institutional locus for information gathering and accountability. Their recognition that the scope was expanding beyond arms interdiction, and later that serious actions had not been reported as the law demanded, led first to committee restrictions on aid, then to support of restrictive legislation on the floor of the House, and finally to a cutoff of funds.
But it is important to note that the public outcry and initial opposition in Congress to the covert war were stimulated by press coverage. The intelligence committees did not initially take leadership: they could have objected to the covert aid, warned the President that they would bring their objections to the floor for debate, and then, if the President still insisted, actively led a floor fight. Instead, these committees allowed themselves to be used by the President to create an antecedent state of things that then limited later debate on the contra war and on other major war-making operations carried out in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola.
What The greatest violation of the spirit of the War Powers Act was in the Nicaraguan case. Not only did the contra effort pose an immediate danger of creating an antecedent state of things that could draw in U.S. troops, it also established a dangerous precedent for the conduct of foreign policy. Using covert action as a central instrument of American foreign policy, where the only congressional checks were intelligence committees whose oversight function was never meant to cover generalized war, meant that crucial foreign policies were initiated and conducted in a highly secret, unaccountable way. Misrepresenting the size and mission of the contras (arms interdiction) and failing to meet reporting requirements (the mining, the terror manual) made things worse. When Congress cut off funds, the White House circumvented Congress's power of the purse by helping to organize a private funding network and managing it for over two years.
An important foreign policy commitment was established with minimum scrutiny and public debate. Congress by and large acquiesced and failed to act, even when information was brought to it that private funding was circumventing its decisions and that high members of the National Security Council were helping to coordinate this effort. The few members who protested were unable to get enough support to investigate publicly, let alone stop such executive actions. The President, acting as commander in chief, took incremental actions that slowly created an antecedent state of things. Congress lacked the political will to block the small steps, even though legally it could have done much more. Gradually, commitment by accretion made it more difficult for Congress to share control of policy making. was not simply due to the character of the legislation. Senator Fulbright's 1972 observation is just as true today: "It is not a lack of power which has prevented the Congress from ending the war in Indochina, but a lack of will."39 We need to explain why Congress has not been more vociferous and forceful in using the institutional mechanisms and authority it has to prevent executive disregard for the commitments of the post-Vietnam formula. There are a number of explanations given in the general literature on Congress and foreign policy: the fragmentation of the foreign policy process within Congress, the president's ability to shape and present information, and the difficulty of rallying congressional opposition to small encroachments of its authority. There is some truth in all of these explanations, but there is also a more fundamental problem. On the one hand, Congress faces a hard-to-control national security apparatus dedicated to maintaining U.S. hegemony and largely unchallenged by the post-Vietnam reforms. The powerful intelligence and security agencies created after World War II embodied norms of secrecy, speed, unity, and efficiency that were antithetical to constitutional democracy. On the other hand, there is no "anti-imperial" political coalition strong enough to force Congress to check the executive and to enforce legislation against the security bureaucracy.
A coalition to reform substantively the security apparatus must challenge the foreign policy that justifies the existence of the apparatus itself. Arthur Schlesinger has argued:
The Imperial Presidency was essentially the creation of foreign policy. A combination of doctrines and emotions -belief in permanent and universal crisis, fear of communism, faith in the duty and the right of the United States to intervene swiftly in every part of the world -had brought about the unprecedented centralization of decisions over war and peace in the Presidency.40
While the post-Vietnam commitment did include a reluctance to commit troops and some tolerance for leftist regimes, moderates and conservatives still shared the same underlying strategic vision -revolutionary regimes of the left were antithetical to U.S. global interests. The U.S. still had the right and responsibility to maintain its hegemony and to minimize the chances of leftist outbreaks and takeovers. The difference between moderates and conservatives was over means, not ends. Moderates saw local repression and poverty as the causes of revolution and argued for human rights and economic development -a position similar to the old Alliance for Progress. Conservatives saw Soviet-backed intervention and subversion as the causes of revolution. They argued for primarily military responses to Third World revolutions. And no one argued for substantial change in the national security apparatus that planned and administered so much of foreign policy.41 When the Reagan administration came into office it inherited the existing security bureaucracy and brought back the conservative version of the strategic vision. It emphasized not simply the containment but rollback of leftist governments ("The Reagan Doctrine"). In this context, the New Right and the Reagan administration could draw on a continued fear of communism and fears of declining U.S. power and hegemony once again to define debate in terms of cold-war assumptions. Such assumptions made it difficult for many of the middle-of-the-road swing voters in Congress to resist the President's persistent demands for a proxy army strategy against Nicaragua. Especially after he created an antecedent state of things, they found themselves trapped between their opposition to communism and their opposition to U.S. troop commitments, between "no more Cubas" and "no more Vietnams." Accepting the end of undermining the Sandinistas and seeing no alternative means except the contras, they were open to persuasion.
If cold-war assumptions make it difficult to challenge the executive on specific issues, they make it extremely hard even to put the restructuring of the national security bureaucracy on the political agenda, let alone to challenge its organization and vision against a well-organized and entrenched right. As long as moderates and conservatives both share the assumption that the United States has the right and responsibility to keep (or get) leftist revolutionary regimes out of power, they are trapped into supporting a chronic cold war and the means necessary to carry it out -a largely unaccountable and uncontrollable imperial president and the security apparatus he manages. As long as cold-war assumptions guide policy, Schlesinger argued, there will be a demand "for concentration of authority, secrecy, speed and discretion in the Presidency."42 And "in a country chronically at war, as America has been for the last three decades" wrote Senator J. William Fulbright in 1972, "even the most energetic and ingenious means of reasserting Congressional prerogative will of themselves prove insufficient to the maintenance of constitutional government.43*
